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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RICE, MELBY ENTERPRISES, INC. ,
a Utah corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
Supreme Court No. 17525

-vsSALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of
ilie State of Utah,
Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case involves an action brought by plaintiff-appellant
(Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc.) against defendant-respondent
(Salt Lake County) to rescind a contract for the sale and purchase
of land entered into more than ten (10) years ago because of
purported duress and misrepresentation.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court for Salt Lake County granted defendant's
Motion for Surrnnary Judgment, and, on December 29, 1980, entered a
Summary Judgment of non-liability dismissing plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice and on the merits.

(R. 47-49)

Plaintiff appealed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of dismissal of
appellant's complaint made by the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While appellant's statement of facts portrays a general
scenario of what took place, it is slanted heavily in appellant';
favor and reeks of a seller's belated remorse in having sold its
property.

Respondent accordingly elects to make its own state-

ment of facts.
The land sale contract which is the subject matter of this
appeal was entered into more than ten (10) years ago on
September 20, 1970.

(R. 15-20)

The land sold by appellant

a~

purchased by respondent pursuant to that contract was acquired be
Salt Lake County for the expansion of the Big Cottonwood Park.
The agreed upon consideration set forth in the contract was
timely paid, and, on February 27, 1973, the property was conveyec
to the County by Warranty Deed duly recorded in the Office of thi
County Recorder.
The thrust of appellant's claim to vitiate the more than te:
year old contract is purported duress and misrepresentation. The
purported duress is the assertion that at the time the contract
was entered into, respondent's agent told appellant that unless
appellant voluntarily sold respondent the property which respond,:
was endeavoring to acquire for the expansion of the park,
respondent would institute condemnation proceedings to acquire
it.

I

The misrepresentation claimed by appellant is that responden:
I

I
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r
agent purportedly told appellant at the time the contract was
entered into that the property would be developed into a public
park.
The Big Cottonwood Park for which the property was acquired
has not been fully developed.

The primary reason being the

defeat of the County Recreation Bond Election on August 13, 1974.
Had that bond election been successful,

the County would not only

have been able to complete the development of the Big Cottonwood
Park, which was one of the specific items set forth in the bond
election issue, but, the County also would have been able to
acquire and develop many other recreational sites and facilities.
The above are the basic facts giving rise to appellant's
claim for rescission of the land sale contract for purported
fraud and misrepresentation.

Where additional facts are deemed

necessary, they will be set forth in the brief to support the
points argued by respondent.

Respondent's argument will follow

chronologically the points and argument made by appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TORT CLAIM OF DURESS AND/OR MISREPRESENTATION WHICH APPELLANT ASSERTED AGAINST
RESPONDENT MUST FAIL UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. HOWEVER, EVEN IF
RESPONDENT'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY BE DEEMED
WAIVED, APPELLANT STILL CANNOT PREVAIL
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT.
In Point I appellant endeavors to overcome its admitted
failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Utah
Governmental Act which respondent interposed as one of several
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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defenses to appellant's tort claim against respondent (R. 8-9) b·.
stating on page 4 of its brief:
" ... any contract inherently carries with it
the contractual right to seek a remedy for
fraud, misrepresentation, or duress regardless of whether said remedy is expressly
provided for in the contract .... " (Emphasis
supplied)
Appellant cites the case of Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 in
support of the above quoted assertion; and, on page 4 of its
brief then says:
" ... The Corporation's cause of action does,
therefore, arise out of a contractual right;
consequently 63-30-5 waives governmental
immunity, the notice requirements under
63-30-12, 63-30-13, and the undertaking
requirement of 63-30-19."
Neither Lamb v. Bangart nor any other case respondent knows
of says or implies that because fraud, misrepresentation or
duress, under certain circumstances, may possibly vitiate a
contract, that therefore fraud, misrepresentation or duress is a
contractual right upon which a suit against a governmental entity
may be based, since, as to contracts, governmental immunity has
been waived.

Horn book law teaches that fraud, misrepresentation

and duress sound in tort--not in contract.

How respondent can

reach such a twisted, tortured interpretation of the language in
the Lamb v. Bangart decision is beyond respondent.
The analyses as to the governmental immunity defenses which
were asserted by respondent, and which were considered by the
lower court are set forth in respondent's memoranda which are
part of this record on appeal so they will not be repeated.
R. 25-27 and R. 41-43)
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(See

The concluding statement made by appellant on page 5 of its
/ Jrief in support of its Point I that: -- "The County, by choosing
: to

I
I

purchase the property by contract rather than condemn it,

waived its immunity" -- simply doesn't follow.

Appellant by

i suing respondent for purported duress and misrepresentation was

: suing in tort and not on the contract.

It necessarily follows

: then that even if governmental immunity was waived, appellant
would still have had to comply with the other mandatory provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which appellant did
not do.

POINT II
A SO-CALLED THREAT OF CONDEMNATION IS NOT
SUCH LEGAL DURESS AS TO INVALIDATE AN OTHERWISE VALID LAND ACQUISITION CONTRACT ENTERED
INTO BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY.
Appellant, in its endeavor to invalidate the land contract
it entered into with respondent, and, in support of Point II of
its brief says on page 5 of its brief:
"The contract in the case at bar was induced
by duress .... "
The only duress referred to was the purported threat of condemnation made by respondent.

Then on page 6 of its brief appellant

says:

"Because the County threatened condemnation
when it was not disposed to do so, the
Corporation seeks to rescind the contract
under the theory of duress."
Appellant cites no authority for the above assertion.
Furthermore, respondent questions that any such authority can be
found.

With reference to what does in fact constitute actionable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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duress, the Utah Supreme Court in Fox v. Piercey, 227 P. 2d 763,
at page 766 said:
" ... under all the authorities, ancient and
modern, the act or threat constituting duress
must be wrongful."
Assuming that condemnation was threatened if respondent was
unable to acquire the property voluntarily, is there anything
wrongful with that?

It is submitted that it is the usual and

customary practice for all public entities who need private
property for a public purpose to first try to acquire the
property voluntarily, and, if this cannot be done, then infom
the owner that condemnation proceedings will be instituted to
acquire it.

Since in this case the property was in fact

acqu~~

voluntarily without condemnation, why would condemnation be
resorted to so as to subject appellant to the considerable
additional expenditure of time and money necessarily incurred in
any condemnation proceeding?

The mere statement of such a

useless action demonstrates its nonsense.

Furthermore, such a

novel doctrine would be dangerous and leave land titles in
considerable doubt.

It would mean that whenever a public entity

acquired property for a public purpose, it would have to

conde~

because, if it did not condemn, any voluntary acquisition without
condemnation would be voidable since it could always therafter be
said that threats of condemnation were made.

Such a doctrine

would upset more than seventy-five per cent (7 570) of the property
acquisitions made by the various public entities in the United
States.

The mere threat of condemnation simply does not
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I:onstitute duress sufficient to invalidate an otherwise valid
I;ontract.
I Finally, even if the claimed threat of condemnation should
IJe construed as duress legally sufficient to invalidate an other:ilse valid contract, appellant still could not prevail.

This for

the reason it would have to have occurred before or at the time
the contract was signed.
1ears

ago.

In this case, that was more than ten

Accordingly, appellant's claimed duress would long

ago have been barred by the statute of limitations.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S CLAIMED PROMISSORY MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT THE KIND OF MISREPRESENTATION WHICH IS ACTIONABLE UNDER PREVAILING
UTAH LAW.

I

Appellant's claim of misrepresentation by respondent is not
that respondent made a statement of a material fact which was

I false
1

and known to be false, and, which was relied upon by

I appellant

to appellant's damage.

The claimed misrepresentation

ls simply that respondent promised appellant it would develop the

property it acquired from appellant as a park within a reasonable
time.
Even though it is conceded that the property in question has
not yet been fully developed as part of the Big Cottonwood Park,
attention is invited to the fact that appellant does not allege
in its complaint that when the claimed promissory representation
as aforesaid was made, respondent did not intend to carry out
that representation.

It is this deficiency in pleadings, among

other deficiencies, which makes appellant's complaint fatally
rlefective.
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The case of Nielson v. Leamington Mines

& Exploration

Corporation, 48 P.2d 438, involved a situation similar to the one
in the above case.

It was an action to set aside a deed to

certain mining claims purportedly induced by false and fraudulent
representations.
aside the deed.

The lower court found for plaintiff and set
However, that ruling was reversed on appeal.

In

its decision the Utah Supreme Court set forth the following
principles as those governing cases involving fraudulent representations.

At page 441 of the opinion the court said:

"In the case of Campbell v. Zion's Co-op
Horne, etc., Co., 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401, 406,
this court announced the principles governing
cases involving fraudulent representations by
quoting and approving the following language
from Southern Develo~rnent Co. v. Silva, ~25
U.S. 247, 8 S. Ct. 8 1, 31 L. Ed. 678:
In
order to establish a charge of this character
the complainant must show by clear and
decisive proof: First, that the defendant
has made a representation in regard to a
material fact; secondly, that such representation is false; thirdly, that such
representation was not actually believed by
the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be
true; fourthly, that it was made with intent
that it should be acted on; fifthly, that it
was acted on by complainant to his damage;
and, sixthly, that in so acting on it the
complainant was ignorant of its falsity, and
reasonably believed it to be true.
The first
of the foregoing requisites excludes such
statements as consist merely in the expression
of opinion or judgment, honestly entertained; .... "
While Nielson v. Leamington Mines

& Exploration

Corporat~,

supra, typifies the usual fraud case, Utah does, however, re~g~~
that an action for fraud may also be predicated on a promise
accompanied by a present intention not to perform.

In setting

aside the dismissal of a fraud action based on a promise to do
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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_....i

,0

rnething in the future, this court in Hull v. Flinders, 27 P.2d

i6 said at page 57-58 of the opinion:

"The complaint, however, states a cause of
action in deceit. The complaint is bottomed,
not on breach of contract, but on misrepresentation and the substitution of the corporation instead of the defendant as the one
obligated to perform the promise made of
payment of installments as they became due on
the mortgage. Plaintiff relies on the rule
that an action for fraud may be predicated on
a promise accompanied by the present intention
not to perform it, made for the purpose of
deceiving the promisee, thereby inducing him
to act where otherwise he would not have done
so, and by virtue of which he parted with his
money. 12 R.C.L. 261; 27 C.J. 35, see
annotations 51 A.L.R. 46; Snyder v. City Bond
& Finance Co., 106 Cal. App. 745, 289 P. 859.
This rule is supported very generally and is
said to be the majority rule. The theory on
which it is based is well stated in 12 R.C.L.
262, as follows:
'The rule is based on the theory that
one who promises another to do something in
the future as a consideration or inducement
to him to do anything, impliedly asserts a
present intent to carry out his promise; that
the intention to deceive is a condition of
mind, which, when it exists, is as much a
fact as is a condition of the body, notwithstanding that it is more difficult to
prove; and that, therefore a misstatement of
a man's mind is a misstatement of fact. The
gist of the fraud, in such cases, is not the
breach of a promise, but the fraudulent
intent of the promisor or obligor at the time
he makes the promise or executed the contract,
not to perform the same, and to deceive the
obligee by his false promise. Hence to
render nonperformance fraudulent the intention
not to perform must exist when the promise is
made, and if the promise is made in good
faith when the contract is entered into there
is no fraud though the promisor subsequently
changes his mind and fails or refuses to
perform.'
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"Some courts, a numerical minority, hold
that fraud cannot be predicated on a mere
promise, even though accompanied by a present
intention not to perform, on the ground that
ev2n under such circumstances t~e promise is
not the misrepresentation of an existing
fact. Where the minority rule is followed,
it is held that the remedy in sue~ case, ! f
any, is to sue upon the promise. 12 R.C.L.
262.
,Je are inclined to follow the majority
rule and hold the complaint states a cause of
action for misrepresentation of a fact, in
that the allegation is that defendant made
the promise to pay the mortgage and to post
as security $3,500 of bonds of the General
Finance Company, and at the time he had no
present intention of keeping his promise,
because he at once drew a contract in writing,
which plaintiff says he did not and could not
read and did not agree to, wherein the
obligations defendant had promised to assume
were shifted to the corporation of which he
was an officer, and, instead of bonds, mere
stock of the company was posted as security."
Appellant's complaint does not allege that when the claimed
misrepresentation was made by respondent that it would develop
the property it was acquiring from appellant as a park, it was
respondent's intention at that time not to perform and not to
develop the property as a park.

It always was and still is

respondent's intention to develop the property as a park.

The

property will be fully developed as part of the Big Cottonwood
Park as soon as funds are available.

The so-called promissory

misrepresentation alleged by appellant in its complaint simply
doesn't meet the criteria for an actionable misrepresentation
established by Hull v. Flinders, supra, which has never been
repealed.
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POINT IV
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BECAUSE THE
PROPERTY RESPONDENT ACQUIRED FROM APPELLANT
HAS NOT BEEN FULLY DEVELOPED AS A PARK IS
WITHOUT MERIT.
In support of its Point 3 about being entitled to damages,
appellant reiterates and reaffirms the only claim it makes
against respondent, i.e., a so-called promissory misrepresentation
by stating in the concluding paragraph for that point on page 8
of its brief:

"The Corporation is, therefore, entitled to
damages incurred in detrimentally relying on
the County's promised development .... "
(Emphasis supplied)
At no time has appellant ever alleged that at the time the
promise was made it was the intention of respondent not to
perform.

As this court said in Hull v. Flinders, supra, on page

55:

" ... To render nonperformance fraudulent the
intention not to perform must exist when the
promise is made, and if the promise is made
in good faith when the contract is entered
into there is no fraud though the promisor
subsequently changes his mind and fails or
refuses to perform."
See also 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 85, at page 130:
"No charge of fraud will lie where the
intended use of the property is stated in
good faith, but the purchaser afterward
changes his mind .... "
Respondent has not changed its mind.

The property will in fact

be developed as soon as funds are available.
In the case of Olsen v. Bd. of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist.,
571 P.2d 1336, condemnation proceedings were initiated in 1964 to

I

L
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acquire certain property for the construction of school buildinr,
A judgment of condemnation was entered in 1966.
property was never put to its intended use.
declared surplus and sold.

However, the

In 1966 it was

Although an effort was made to have

the condemnation declared void or voidable because the acquired
property was never put to its intended use, the condemnation by
which the school district originally acquired the property was
nevertheless upheld.
Finally, appellant, to support Point III in its brief that
it is entitled to damages because it justifiably relied on
respondent's promised performance to develop the acquired propen:

j

as a park, asserts on page 5:
" ... Failure to carry out the promised development constituted a 'second taking' for which
the County must pay adequate consideration."

1

Appellant then cites the Alaska cases of Alsop v. State, 586 P.2d !
I

1236, and Grant v. State, 560 P.2d 36 in support thereof.
Neither of those cases is in point.
The Alsop case was an attempted class action case for
declaratory relief.

Alsop's property had been condemned in a

prior condemnation proceeding as part of the proposed New Seward
Highway.

He had expressly conditioned the settlement of his

I

condemnation case on the continuation of unrestricted access to
that highway at the 76th Avenue intersection.

A subsequent plan )

for upgrading the highway, among other things, called for closure

I

of the 76th Avenue intersection.

I

While the Alaska Supreme Court held that a class action was 1
not proper, it did say in part in its opinion at page 1240:
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1

l

"We hold that in order to recover damages,
each of the appellants must demonstrate that
he or a predecessor in interest had a portion
of his property taken for the original
construction project, that he or his predecessor relied on construction of an intersection at ?6th Avenue or the two-way frontage
road, or both, in settling or receiving an
award for their condemnation claims, and that
his remaining property has decreased in value
as a result of the highway modification."
The Grant case, like the Alsop case, concerned a deprivation
of access because of a change in highway construction plans.
i~ovember

In

of 1972, Grant's prior owner of the property, Mathis,

along with eight others, sued the State of Alaska in inverse
condemnation for purported deprivation of access to adjacent
property.

A month thereafter Mathis sold the property to Grant,

reserving its inverse condemnation claim against the State.

In

1972, at the time of the conveyance from Mathis to Grant, the
State's highway construction plans called for an underpass
culvert which would permit ingress and egress of small craft to
the Mathis property.

During construction of the expressway in

1974, however, the culvert collapsed and the State decided it
would not be replaced.

In March of 1975 Mathis settled its

inverse condemnation with the State in which settlement she
acknowledged receipt of payment of compensation for the taking of
the water access and damages arising out of or resulting from the
taking.

After the Mathis settlement, the Grants, in October of

1975, sued the State of Alaska in inverse condemnation asserting
that when they purchased the property from Mathis in 1972, they
relied on the State's plan in existence at that time to provide
an underpass culvert directly in front of the property which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would provide access to the property.

In that suit the lower

court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the
State's theory that Grant's predecessor in interest had
been paid for this very claim.

alr~~

In reversing the summary j udgr,·

and remanding for a new trial, the Supreme Court of Alaska sai,

I

in part in its opinion at page 39:
" ... There was a second economic interference
when the state decided not to replace the
collapsed culvert .... "
The court said further at page 40:
"In light of our reversal of the superior
court's grant of summary judgment to the
state, on remand the superior court should
grant the state's motion for leave to file a
third-party complaint or to require the
joinder of Ms. Mathis.
We believe that i f
l~. Mathis is made party to the suit, the
state's seemingly reasonable claim that they
compensated her for all damages to the
subject property's littoral access can be
properly adjudicated."
Unlike the situation in the Alsop and Grant cases, supra,
wherein a change in plans actually deprived the property owners
of access to their property, the subject case involves a promis·
sory representation of some future intended action which has no:j
yet been fully consummated.

Under the decision in Hull v. Flir.i

such a promissory representation is not actionable.
POINT V
THE CAUSES OF ACTIOH WHICH APPELLAHT ASSERTS
AGAIHST RESPONDE~lT HAVE NOT AHD DO NOT EXTEND
THE STATUTE OF LIHITATIONS.
In Point IV of its brief appellant argues that the causes··
action it asserts against respondent extend the statute of
limitations.

Appellant states in this connection on page 4:
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"The contract in the case at bar was induced
by duress and misrepresentation.
In cases of
duress and misrepresentation, the running of
the statute of limitations may be delayed
until discovery of the misrepresentation or
release from the duress .... "
Appellant fails to recognize that it did not sue respondent
on the contract.

There is no language whatsoever in the contract

between the parties which obligates respondent to develop the
property respondent acquired from appellant into a park.
(R. 15-20)

Appellant's claim against respondent is a tort claim

based on duress and misrepresentation.

The purported duress is

that respondent threatened condemnation unless appellant would
rol@tarily sell respondent the property.
To support its contention that its claim of duress extends
the statute of limitations, appellant cites 25 Am. Jur. 2d,
Duress and Undue Influence, Section 28 (1966), stating that i t is
incumbent upon one from whom property has been obtained by duress
to avoid the contract when released from the duress.

Even if the

threat of condemnation constituted duress, which it does not, how
could appellant still be under that so-called duress after the
contract which was purportedly induced by that duress has been
signed?

Upon the signing of the contract there would no longer

Qe any such duress because there would be no necessity to

continue to threaten condemnation because the object of the
threatened condemnation would have already been achieved.

In

this case, the contract was signed more than ten years ago so
appellant at that time was released of any so-called duress by
'1irtue

of any threatened condemnation.

The statute of limitations
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for duress accordingly began to run at that time.

Appellant's

claim of duress at this late date is necessarily barred by the
statute of limitations and the running of that statute has not
been extended.
To support its contention that its cause of action for
misrepresentation has been extended, appellant cites
51 Arn. Jur. 2d, Limitations of Action, Section 126 (1970),
stating that a right of action on a contract does not accrue,
and, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
contract is to be performed.

The perforrnance set forth in the

contract between the parties is not the development of a parkk
the conveyance of property upon the payment of the agreed upon
consideration.

In this case, both parties fully performed

precisely as their contract obligated them to do.

Respondent

paid and appellant conveyed.
Appellant's cause of action for a purported promissory
misrepresentation is a tort claim and not a contract claim.

Thi

kind of so-called promissory misrepresentation which appellant
sets forth as its cause of action against respondent is not u
actionable misrepresentation under the circumstances of this
case.

This has been fully treated in respondent's Point III sc

the argument thereon will not be repeated here.
Appellant simply does not have a cause of action against
respondent for misrepresentation so its claimed cause of actior.
for misrepresentation does not extend the statute of limitatioc 1
I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

1

I

POINT VI
RESPONDENT CONCEDES THAT CAUSES OF ACTION
BASED ON DURESS AND HISREPRESENTATION DO NOT
VIOLATE THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.
Appellant's Point Vis that its causes of action do not
v~late

the parol evidence rule.

~pellant

In support of this assertion

states on page 10 of its brief that:
"In the instant case, the Corporation's cause
of action is not based on the interpretation
of the written contract, but is based on
matters of misrepresentation and duress .... "

The above statement seems inconsistent with appellant's prior
statement supporting its Point I when on page 4 of its brief it
said:
"The Corporation's cause of action does,
therefore, arise out of a contractual
right .... "
In spite of the apparent inconsistency in appellant's
assertions, since there is no question but that the causes of
action against respondent are based on duress and misrepresentation, it is not necessary for respondent to respond to
appellant's Point V.

Respondent concedes that causes of action

based on duress and misrepresentation do not violate the parol
evidence rule.
POINT VII
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT
BEEH IMPAIRED. APPELLANT WAS PAID JUST
COMPENSATION FOR ITS PROPERTY WHICH WAS
ACQUIRED BY RESPONDENT.
In support of its Point VI appellant makes the statement on
page 11 of its brief that:
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r
"The Corporation's constitutional rights have
been violated because just compensation has
not been tendered for the Corporation's
property .... "
Both Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States
and Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah mandate that private property shall not be taken for public
use without the payment of just compensation.
just compensation.

Appellant was pai:

The contract for the sale and purchase of thE

property was voluntarily entered into by the parties.

The

consideration provided for therein was timely paid and accepted
Thereafter, a deed of conveyance was duly executed, delivered ani'
recorded.

There is no merit to appellant's assertion that just

compensation was not tendered for its property.
CONCLUSION
Giving careful consideration to all the facts set forth in
the pleadings as well as all reasonable inferences which may be
derived therefrom, and, applying the prevailing Utah law thereto.
the dismissal of appellant's complaint by the lower court was
proper and should accordingly be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney

Attorney
Defendant-Respond«
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I hereby certify that one this

day of June, 1981,

:mailed two (2) copies of Respondent's Brief via U. S. Mail
in

a sealed envelope with postage prepaid thereon and addressed

to appellant's attorney as follows:

Thomas J. Klc
Attorney at Law
4625 South 2300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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